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Abstract: In his article, "Theory, Period Styles, and Comparative Literature as Discipline,"
Slobodan Sucur attempts to answer the following question: Can a rapprochement be brought
about between various, often antagonistic, literary-theoretical views and the concept of
comparative literature itself, which requires accord, consensus, agreement, etc., for it to function
as a concrete body and discipline? Sucur attempts dealing with this question in three parts of the
paper: First, he establishes a relationship/link between the theoretical discord of today
(humanism, formalism, deconstruction, etc.) and the high theorizing which began during the JenaBerlin phase of Romanticism (Shelling, Hegel, F. Schlegel, etc.); secondly, he attempts linking the
origin of comparative literature with later Romanticism (Virgil Nemoianu's idea of the Biedermeier)
in order to account for some inconsistencies between ideas of "theory" on the one hand, and
"discipline" on the other; and thirdly, he speculates on whether or not "literary history" -- an idea
often neglected now -- can be the bridge where literary theory meets up with comparative
literature as a disciplinary endeavor, that is, in the act of writing a comparative literary history.
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Slobodan SUCUR
Theory, Period Styles, and Comparative Literature as Discipline
It is sometimes said that the origins of comparative literature are tied to debates concerning the
renewal of the notion of literature, tied together because such theoretical debates on literariness,
text, aesthetics, etc., and theoretical debates in general which still affect us, appear to originate
with the Jena-Berlin school of Romanticism (the first phase), the approximate period from which
the origins of comparative literature emanate as well. The question which looms large here is the
following: Can a rapprochement be brought about between various, often antagonistic, literarytheoretical views and the concept of comparative literature itself, which requires accord,
consensus, agreement, etc., for it to function as a concrete body and discipline? I will deal with the
question by splitting this paper into three parts. In the first part, I will expose the antagonistic
nature of theory by looking at some formalist, deconstructionist, and humanist views, views which
seem to feed on each other for survival, and which pose a threat to the notion of smoothly
operating disciplines such as Comparative Literature, Art History, etc.; the antagonism,
inconsistency, and confusion which is present in and arises because of the polemic nature of these
views will be traced back to early Romanticism. In the second part of the paper, I will use Ali
Behdad's concept of "belatedness," juxtaposed onto Virgil Nemoianu's argument for a Biedermeier
style, to explain why comparative literature as a discipline seems to be a product of the same
Romanticism that gave birth to high theorizing but simultaneously seems to be divided and at odds
with this "other," theoretical product; I will attempt to account for this supposed paradox. In the
third and final part of the paper, I will attempt to reconcile theory and discipline (i.e., comparative
literature) by bringing in the notion of literary history as a medium through which antagonisms can
be subsumed, and perhaps even cancelled out, by larger narrative accounts of literary and
theoretical development, by meta-endeavors, as it were; I will also speak of other concepts in this
final section.
Theory, Discord, and Early Romanticism
It may be odd that I am beginning a discussion on theory, discord, and Romanticism by citing
examples from Russian Formalism, because the latter school of thought is often said to be antiRomantic, especially in its reaction against Symbolist poetics, as Selden says in his A Reader's
Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory: The Futurists, who provided the initial impetus for
Formalism, directed their artistic efforts "against 'decadent' bourgeois culture and especially
against the anguished soul-searching of the Symbolist movement in poetry and the visual arts …
[and against] the mystical posturing of poets" (30). Nonetheless, certain Formalist assumptions
were later attacked by post-structuralism, leading to conceptual opposition and discord, and
besides, while Selden believes that Formalism was anti-Romantic owing to its avoidance of
Symbolist assumptions, we may also argue that Symbolism was itself anti-Romantic owing to its
elaboration on earlier, romantic tendencies, and so on.
As I have said, certain Formalist assumptions were later attacked, and this is why I mention
such assumptions. One of the clearest examples of Formalism is found in Victor Shklovsky's
article, "Art as Technique," where one of the major points is that the very phrase, "works of art,"
designates those "works created by special techniques designed to make the works as obviously
artistic as possible" (17). What Shklovsky is working towards with such a comment is the idea of
art, in this case poetry, as an autonomous construct, a self-sufficient entity that is set up through
conscious craftsmanship: He cements the essence of his argument later by saying that what is
required is a proper distinction "between the laws of practical language and the laws of poetic
language" (19). Further on, Shklovsky offers a sentence that has been quoted and criticized often:
"Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not important" (20; italics in
the original). Near the end of the article, he once again reaffirms his views be saying that "a
strong tendency … to create a new and properly poetic language has emerged. In the light of these
developments we can define poetry as attenuated, tortuous speech. Poetic speech is formed
speech. Prose is ordinary speech -- economical, easy, proper, the goddess of prose [dea prosae] is
a goddess of the accurate, facile type, of the 'direct' expression of a child" (28). In his article,
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"Linguistics and Poetics," Roman Jakobson continues with this thrust towards an autonomous
definition of literature, a thrust which is representative of the earlier phase of Formalism. He
speaks of how "the terminological confusion of 'literary studies' with 'criticism' tempts the student
of literature to replace the description of the intrinsic values of a literary work by a subjective,
censorious verdict. The label 'literary critic' applied to an investigator of literature is as erroneous
as 'grammatical (or lexical) critic' would be applied to a linguist. Syntactic and morphological
research cannot be supplanted by a normative grammar, and likewise no manifesto, foisting a
critic's own tastes and opinions on creative literature, may act as a substitute for an objective
scholarly analysis of verbal art” (33). We can see obvious formalistic tendencies in Jakobson's
comments, for there is the phrase, "intrinsic values of literature," the phrase, "objective scholarly
analysis of verbal art" (which foreshadows New Criticism), and more generally, the comments
voice a need for a specialized and élitist grammar to deal with literature. This emphasis on the
concept of pure literature and specialized study of that literature is reflected once again in
Jakobson's argument when he gives a brief, but almost fetish-like analysis of Poe's "The Raven" at
a linguistic level that emphasizes the "literariness" of words (particularly in poetry): "The perch of
the raven, 'the pallid bust of Pallas,' is merged through the 'sonorous' paronomasia /páel*d/ -/páel*s/ into one organic whole (similar to Shelley's molded line ‘Sculptured on alabaster obelisk'
/sk.lp/ -- /l.b.st/ -- /b.l.sk/). Both confronted words were blended earlier in another epithet of the
same bust -- placid /pláesld/ -- a poetic portmanteau, and the bond between the sitter and the
seat was in turn fastened by a paronomasia: 'bird or beast upon the … bust.' The bird 'is sitting //
On the pallid bust of Pallas just above my chamber door,' and the raven on his perch, despite the
lover's imperative ‘take thy form from off my door,' is nailed to the place by the words **st *b*v/,
both of them blended in /b*st/" (50). A fascination with words is quite obvious in this description,
but equally so, we can sense a strong linguistic/grammatical presence, in the sense that the
thematic meaning of Poe's poem is being rejected in favor of an assessment of textual and verbal
structures; in this way, we can clearly see how Formalism goes beyond the impressionistic and
thematic, moral commentary of late nineteenth-century liberal humanist criticism. In Jakobson's
article, there is a fascination with the mechanical nature and presence of words, and a need for
ordered and structured, "objective" linguistic assessment, a need which can be felt in his other
article as well, "The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles," particularly near the conclusion, when
Jakobson says that "there exist … grammatical and anti-grammatical but never agrammatical
rhymes" (61).
While the early phase of Russian Formalism goes beyond the historical contextualism and
obviously subjective, impressionistic commentary of nineteenth-century literary criticism, by
returning to "the text" itself and to the presence of "the word" as an object, entity, and structure
that defines certain things as being proper "literature," already in Mikhail Bakhtin's article, "From
the Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse," we find the beginnings of a critique that is directed at the
earlier, formalistic assumptions. While Bakhtin does not go so far as to deconstruct the concept of
literature per se, and of self-sustaining artforms, he does do a subtle shift on the Jakobsonian-type
argument by emphasizing the need for stylistic rather than linguistically/scientifically oriented
studies, especially because "the distinctive features of novelistic discourse, the stylistic specificum
of the novel as a genre, remained as before unexplained" (126). Bakhtin's emphasis on stylistic
study seems to open the floor, so to speak, to larger social and/or historical questions, as
exemplified when he cites Belinsky (who called Pushkin's Evgenij Onegin "an encyclopedia of
Russian life") and then argues against the one-sidedness of Belinsky's comment. It is best to quote
most of the passage in question, because the critique against certain aspects of Formalism
(Shklovsky's defamiliarization, linguistic emphasis, aesthetic unity, etc.) is present to a great
degree:
But this is no inert encyclopedia that merely catalogues the things of everyday life. Here Russian life speaks
in all its voices, in all the languages and styles of the era. Literary language is not represented in the novel
as a unitary, completely finished-off and indisputable language—it is represented precisely as a living mix
of varied and opposing forces [raznorecivost'], developing and renewing itself. The language of the author
strives to overcome the superficial 'literariness' of moribund, outmoded styles and fashionable period-bound
languages; it strives to renew itself by drawing on the fundamental elements of folk language … Pushkin's
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novel is a self-critique of the literary language of the era, a product of this language's various strata ...
utually illuminating one another. But this interillumination is not of course accomplished at the level of
linguistic abstraction: images of language are
inseparable from images of various world views and from
living beings who are their agents -- people who think, talk, and act in a setting that is social and
historically concrete.... The stylistic structure of Evgenij Onegin is typical of all authentic novels. To a
greater or lesser extent, every novel is a dialogized system made up of the images of 'languages,' styles
and consciousness that are concrete and inseparable from language. Language in the novel not only
represents, but itself serves as the object of representation. Novelistic discourse is always criticizing itself.
(131)

While Bakhtin appears to set up a subtle critique of Formalism in order to resurrect certain
aspects of liberal humanist discourse, but in a more modern, socialized and polyphonic way, so as
not to repeat the kind of humanism that Formalism had itself critiqued, it is Jacques Derrida's
seminal article, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," which goes
into a different grey area, so to speak, by exposing the fallacies of Lévi-Strauss' work (as a
structural anthropologist). One might initially expect that Derrida, by arguing against Strauss'
approach (which we might consider a modernized and refined humanism, as in Bakhtin's case),
will eventually come back to some sort of neo-Formalist position (with its emphasis on linguistics
and the word as a "sign"), but Derrida also critiques Formalism's position as an alternative to
humanistic and structural discourse, when he speaks of how if we wish to extend "the domain or
play of signification" infinitely, then we must also reject "the concept and word 'sign' itself -- which
is precisely what cannot be done," since we are also caught up in the metaphysics of presence
(395). Derrida becomes more specific in his argument when he speaks of two notions
of "totalization," where the classical explanation of why totalization is impossible is because there
are too many things to empirically circumscribe, and the new explanation of why totality is
impossible is because the field of vision, the act of circumscription, is itself finite and totalization is
outside the field of "play," play being a concept which Derrida explains as the "movement of
supplementarity" that is "permitted by the lack or absence of a center or origin," that is "no longer
turned toward the origin" (like the classical attempt at totalization) but rather is a new
interpretation, "to which Nietzsche pointed the way," which "tries to pass beyond man and
humanism" and does not seek the "inspiration of a new humanism" (404-08). Derrida's critique is
therefore directed at the traditional concept of humanism (nineteenth-century mode), at the "new
humanism" of Bakhtinian and Lévi-Strauss-like arguments (which is dispersed, polyphonic, difficult
to detect, etc.), and at Formalism per se (with its love of the word-sign as a linguistic entity on
which we build definitions of literariness, something that Derrida problematizes by destabilizing the
Saussurian concept of sign).
This can-of-worms which deconstruction has opened up has of course created a larger split
between theory and discipline (i.e., comparative literature) than was previously present. In fact,
the literariness which Formalism was searching for, together with its division between poetry
proper and other literary forms, and together with New Criticism's emphasis on the autonomous
artifact (which we also sense in Shklovsky's article), was rather beneficial for the concept of
institution, department, discipline, and so on. Since disciplines, especially as they grow, require
stability and consensus, then Formalist and New Critical notions of literariness, which maintain the
stability of the literary canon, also maintain the élitism and command-structure by which most
departments and disciplines begin. In other words, the first step in destabilizing the boundaries of
a discipline such as comparative literature, and even art history, etc., is to throw away such terms
as artfulness and pure literature, which in turn destabilizes the boundaries of the canon (which
may consist of books or paintings) and which defines the discipline in question, and is a marker by
which the discipline measures itself. Needless to say, owing to deconstruction, definitions of
literature have become more liberal and the canon more flexible, and yet, disciplines still exist,
and many have neither collapsed nor fused with other disciplines. Part of the explanation for this
anomaly is that, while deconstruction has problematized things, the very fact that deconstruction
as a theoretical approach is "undefinable" in the traditional sense allows for institutionally and
departmentally beneficial comments to circulate within it (however peculiar this may seem, it
explains why institutions have not collapsed, but rather, deconstruction has itself become
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institutionalized).
One of the most interesting examples of such duplicity is in Paul de Man's article, "The
Resistance to Theory," where, among other things, like arguing for a built-in duplicity within theory
itself, de Man also, however post-structural his comments may be, seems to maintain, in a subtle
fashion of course, that literature is still an autonomous and inherently "literary" entity (which
echoes Formalist and New Critical tendencies): "Literature is fiction not because it somehow
refuses to acknowledge 'reality,' but because it is not a priori certain that language functions
according to principles which are those, or which are like those, of the phenomenal world. It is
therefore not a priori certain that literature is a reliable source of information about anything but
its own language" (362). However inverted de Man's comment may be, it once again, like
Formalism, defines literature as a primarily linguistic and syntactic entity, and nothing more; of
course, in de Man's case, rather than defining literature as successful if it attains fictive and
aesthetic heights, he defines literature as inevitably failing since it inevitably is fictive and
aesthetic, but in turn, this inevitable failure can be looked upon as a success, because in this
context, literature that thinks it records reality would be a failure. This upholding of literariness,
however pessimistic and inverted it may be, still maintains the stability (however hollow) of
departments and disciplines, because the presence of a canon is now maintained; since the "best"
texts are inevitably literary and aesthetic (through failure), the canon will forever be rejuvenated
and maintained as a healthy entity, because these failed texts will be canonized as the "best
texts," and so on, and because most texts fail in being mimetic, there is no chance that secondrate encyclopedias will ever be canonized. De Man's comments are even more complex than I have
indicated, because while his inverted support of literariness may echo Formalism, he does say that
"no grammatical decoding, however refined, could claim to reach the determining figural
dimensions of a text" (367). Such complexities in argument allow de Man to maintain the stability
of disciplines and institutions at the same time that he destabilizes them, so that it becomes
difficult for us to assess the precise role of theory in institutions, or as he says regarding theory at
the conclusion of his article: "What remains impossible to decide is whether this flourishing is a
triumph or a fall" (371).
Perhaps it is because of such cases of undecidability that neo-humanist critics like M.H. Abrams
and E.D. Hirsch Jr. have argued against deconstructive and duplicitous modes of thought. Abrams,
in his article, "The Deconstructive Angel," appears to go back to a fundamentally humanist yet
refined, and thematically-oriented position. He argues, with reference to Derrida, that his own
"view of language, as it happens, is by and large functional and pragmatic: language, whether
spoken or written, is the use of a great variety of speech-acts to accomplish a great diversity of
human purposes; only one of these many purposes is to assert something about a state of affairs;
and such a linguistic assertion does not mirror, but serves to direct attention to selected aspects of
that state of affairs" (266). Hirsch, in his article, "Faulty Perspectives," concludes by saying that no
matter how duplicitious and multi-layered one's perspective may be, there is no denying that
behind such perspective rests an "empirical actuality," an actuality that is the source of
perspective, maintains it, and will always "call in doubt a basic premise of hermeneutical relativism
and, with it, most of the presently fashionable forms of cognitive atheism" (263).
This Pandora's Box -- which we call theory -- with its many antagonisms, variations, subtleties,
and confusions, and with its potential to destabilize and threaten the presence of disciplines such
as comparative literature, seems to have its modern origin, as it were, in the Jena-Berlin school of
Romanticism, the first phase of the movement. The theorizing of the early Romantic phase also
possesses inconsistencies, and antagonisms, and this discord may indeed have filtered down into
modern theoretical debates between Humanism, Formalism, Deconstruction, and so on. Miroslav
John Hanak, in his A Guide to Romantic Poetry in Germany, speaks of the high theorizing of the
early Romantic school, and through his discussion, one sees the same discord and confusion that
occurs when an Abrams or a Hirsch argues against a Derrida or a Paul de Man, or when a Bakhtin
does a variation in thought on a Shklovsky or a Jakobson. Hanak's discussion of idealism and
theory in early Romanticism can be split, I believe, into three phases, where each successive
phase builds upon the discord and development of the previous phase. The three phases would be
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as follows: a) Hamann and Herder versus Kant; b) Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel versus Kant and
each other; and c) Friedrich Schlegel attempts a reconciliation of contradictions (and may either
parallel or precede Hegel in his endeavors). The problematics of theory and philosophy which still
affect us start a bit earlier than the Jena-Berlin phase of Romanticism (1796-1803), but they lead
up to this culminating phase, and thus deserve attention. Herder's Ideas for the Philosophy of
History and Mankind (1784-91), which developed a philosophy of history and ethnic psychology,
greatly inspired Kant, but in a negative way, to write his own interpretation of the historic process
in An Idea for a Universal History from the Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784) (5). This work by
Herder, considered his magnum opus, "brought up to date the principle of Aristotelian entelechy,
the embodiment of the highest potentiality of a species, postulating a progressive ontology of all
existence toward the production of ever more perfect specimens," and Herder, like Plato,
"conceived the world as an organism; but rather than a static zoon empsychon ennoun, a creature
endowed with soul and mind, Herder's universe was actually a dynamic evolutionary process from
inanimate to animate nature, culminating in a graduated scale of cultures and individuals" (9).
Kant reacted against his student's views in his An Idea for a Universal History from the
Cosmopolitan point of View, because Kant, as a man of the Enlightenment, regarded past history
as a spectacle of human irrationality, and looked forward to a future Utopia of rational life (Hanak
12). The problematic aspect is that, as Hanak argues, while Kant reacted against Herder's
interpretation, he simultaneously foreshadowed Hegel's own work, because "Kant's view of history
as noumenally grounded reason progressing towards free self-embodiment in the world is already
more of a Hegelian and hence, Romantic vision, than a Kantian principle of progress according to
enlightened and enlightening reason" (13). The entire chain-of-influence is problematic, because
by reacting against his student, Herder, Kant himself went beyond Enlightenment principles.
Herder of course had another teacher, apart from Kant, Johann Georg Hamann, who influenced his
student more so than Kant. Hamann, in his Socratic Memorabilia (1759), argued that the
archrationalist Socrates realized that conceptual knowledge cannot penetrate the ultimate
questions of being, and in this way, Hamann agreed with Kant's positing of an Ultimate Reality
that had to be "assumed" and could not be detected, but instead of denying "absolute conceptual
knowledge of any substance" in order to "make room for faith" (like Kant), Hamann, and Herder,
kept seeking absolute knowledge, not through reason, but through the "affective faculties" (5-6).
As Hanak argues, Hamann and Herder problematized Kant's notions by "radicalizing" the latter's
idea of "intersubjectivity" that was developed in his Third Critique (1791), and by "glorifying as
unique the bias toward sensibility, that paralleled along generally mystic paths the vaunted
rationalism of eighteenth century Enlightenment. Hamann and Herder thus legitimized the nobility
and cognitive force of the affects, bringing about an era which Rousseau and Voltaire had helped
to prepare: the age of Revolution, of emotional, moral and aesthetic liberalism, and of Romantic
Utopias" (6-7).
The second layer of theoretical and philosophical antagonism and subtlety occurs with Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel, and the variations in thought that arise between them (as a reaction to
Kant). Hanak argues that Fichte departs from "Kant's fundamental premise that universal history
is an unfolding of a plan," and that much like "Herder's endeavors to identify the Folk Spirit of
each nation and race, Fichte sought to define the exact spirit of his own age" in works like Doctrine
of Science (1796-98) and The Characteristics of the Present Age (published in 1806) (14-15). In
fact, Hanak goes so far as to state that the "Fichtean metaphysics of becoming reads like a
blueprint for Hegel's Phenomenology, Logic and Encyclopedia" (15). Schelling is considered a
disciple of Fichte, and through him, however remotely, of Kant (18-19). While Schelling's Ideas for
a Philosophy of Nature (1797), On the World Soul (1798), and System of Transcendental Idealism
(1800) may overlap with certain Hegelian concepts, through the use of phrases like "movement of
nature," "Ultimate Truth," and "Universal Mind," Hanak is quick to point out that there is a subtle
difference between Schelling's work and Hegel's: For Hegel, the point of departure is "spiritualrationalist" while for Schelling the starting point is "aesthetical-naturalist," but this is all a matter
of emphasis. For both, the Ground of Being is unconscious and universal, only for Schelling it is the
Absolute as Nature, and for Hegel, the Absolute as Spirit; both agree that the real evolves through
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a process of reason" (19-21). The main difference between Hegel and Schelling is that in Hegel's
Phenomenology, "the Kantian dualism between phenomena and noumena is aufgehoben,
overcome in the broadest sense of the word" (23). In this way, while Fichte and Schelling may
anticipate Hegel's work, it is only Hegel who fully breaks away from Kantian discourse.
Hanak's argument is interesting, particularly the way in which he sets up the various
philosophers as offering polemic or non-polemic answers to Kant (as representative of the
Enlightenment). His argument emphasizes the main point which Frederick C. Beiser is making in
his article, "Early Romanticism and the Aufklärung." Beiser argues that our difficulty in
understanding the phase of early Romanticism stems from the fact that the representatives of the
movement were "neither revolutionaries nor reactionaries. Rather, they were simply reformers,
moderates in the classical tradition" (321). Beiser even looks upon the representatives as "nothing
less than the Aufklärer of the 1790s. They seem to differ from the earlier generation of Aufklärer
only in their disillusionment with enlightened absolutism and in their readiness to embrace
republican ideals" (322). The main problem which the early Romantics had with the Enlightenment
was that "two of its most basic ideals -- radical criticism [which the early Romantics rejected] and
Bildung [which they approved of] -- were in conflict with one another. For if criticism ends in
complete skepticism, then according to what moral, political, and religious principles should we
educate the people" (324)? Beiser's question, which he believes the early Romantics raised, is the
same question that we now raise when we look at the antagonism, rivalry, and fragmentation
which contemporary theory instigates in relation to earlier, structuralist and pre-structuralist
theories. The question which early Romanticism raises about the inconsistencies of the
Enlightenment is the same question which we may raise about the inconsistencies in Derrida's or
de Man's work (and more generally, about the end result of radical criticism). As Beiser says, the
early Romantics did not solve the question through their program of "pure aesthetics," a program
through which the Enlightenment was ironically "consumed by its own flames" (326), much like
early Romanticism, I would add.
Friedrich Schlegel came closest, Hanak argues, to actually solving the contradictions which
were inherent in the Enlightenment. Schlegel's speculations parallel closely the Hegelian system,
but in the case of Hegel, the final solution-synthesis is expected to reveal itself as the "Absolute
Spirit or Knowledge," while in Schlegel's case, the solution will come through "progressive
universal poetry" (qtd. in Hanak 35). Friedrich Schlegel's attempt at resolution came in three
phases. In the first phase (1795-96), he argued that the "flabbiness" and artificiality of modern
literature could be rectified through an improvement on the "highest favor of nature," which, for
him, was classical poetry, or in simpler terms, an improvement on classicism would simultaneously
perfect the romantic program (37). In the second stage of Schlegel's speculation (1796-98), he
defined the novel as the key "genre in literature" and a "Romantic life-style setter," by which the
novel was viewed as a transcendentally-oriented "Christian poetry," a "symbol of the absolute
ideal," the "poetic ideal qua God" (38). In this second phase, Schlegel later modified his views of
the "absolute novel" by introducing the synthetic concept of "irony," through which one could see
that "infinite representation" is still embodied in an "existential and aesthetic profile of clearly
determined, finite outlines," whereby eternity and time are reconciled (40). In the third stage of
his speculation (1799-1800), Schlegel expanded his earlier call for a Romantic "ideal" to include
the creation of a new "mythology" which would "reflect the spiritual tendencies of the times," so
that classical Greek art still remains prototypical for Schlegel, but rather than merely being
surpassed in its "very classicism," it now becomes the prospect for a "limitless growth of
classicism," as stipulated in his 116th Athenäum Fragment (43). As Hanak says, Schlegel's "bid for
a modern mythology gravitates toward Platonic and Christian transcendentalism, rather than
Kantian transcendentalism" (44). Schlegel's metaphysical sweeps did not solve the contradictions
inherent in the Enlightenment, precisely because I now find myself in a rather Schlegelian position
as I go on to the next part of my paper, all the while thinking how I will reconcile theory (with its
discord) and discipline (which requires consensus).
Belatedness, Period Styles, and the Nature of Comparative Literature
Why does comparative literature as a discipline seem to be a product of the same Romanticism
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that gave birth to high theorizing but simultaneously seems to be divided and at odds with this
"other," theoretical product? Is this an enigma? I personally do not think so. Romanticism as a
movement is usually, broadly defined as extending from about 1797 to about 1840 or so, when it
is overtaken by the Realist paradigm; these might be the dates for German Romanticism. In
England, it is thought that Romanticism begins around the time of the French Revolution (1789),
and extends to about Byron's death (1824). Examples can be given of other national literatures as
well. However, it is precisely this over-generalization in period styles and literary movements
which leads to ambiguities that I am attempting to elaborate on in this section of my argument. A
shift in outlook, paradigm, whatever we wish to call it, seems to occur sometime within the period
broadly defined as Romanticism. We can see the difference by looking at what various critics say.
M.H. Abrams, in his article, "English Romanticism: The Spirit of the Age," speaks of how the
Romantic poet of the 1790s, in dealing with current affairs, sets up a procedure which is often
panoramic, where his stage is cosmic, "his agents quasi-mythological, and his logic of events
apocalyptic. Typically this mode of Romantic vision fuses history, politics, philosophy, and religion
into one grand design, by asserting Providence -- or some form of natural teleology" (45-46). This
is Abrams' view of the 1790s in England. Northrop Frye, in his article, "The Drunken Boat: The
Revolutionary Element in Romanticism," speaks of how in "Romanticism proper a prominent place
in sense experience is given to the ear, an excellent receiver of oracles but poor in locating things
accurately in space ... In later poetry, beginning with symbolisme in France ... more emphasis is
thrown on vision. In Rimbaud ... the illuminations are thought of pictorially; even the vowels must
be visually colored ... Such an emphasis leads to a technique of fragmentation. Poe's attack on the
long poem is not a Romantic but an anti-Romantic manifesto, as the direction of its influence
indicates" (23-24).
Ali Behdad, in his Belated Travelers: Orientalism in the Age of Colonial Dissolution, speaks of
how a "belated reading is not an orthodox reiteration or a reapplication of a previous theory;
rather, it is an interventionary articulation of a new problematic through the detour -- or, perhaps
more accurately, retour -- of an earlier practice" (3). He develops the concept of belatedness and
of belated readings in order to account for the late "Orientalism of travelers such as Nerval,
Flaubert, Loti, and Eberhardt [which] vacillates between an insatiable search for a counter
experience in the Orient and the melancholic discovery of its impossibility" (15). Regarding
Flaubert's Notes de voyages (1849-50), Behdad says that "Flaubert abandoned the idea of writing
an organized travelogue like those of his orientalist precursors," that his work was "never
intended" for publishing, and that the "belated orientalist's discourse [like Flaubert's] is thus an
antinarrative, a discursive constellation without a shape, an ideological practice without a doctrine"
(54). While Flaubert's belated orientalist discourse is considered by Behdad as a "constellation
without a shape" and an "ideological practice without a doctrine," comparative literature as a
discipline, and in order to remain a discipline, requires both shape and doctrine. However, if we
exempt certain assumptions of belated Orientalism (as formulated by Behdad) from this
discussion, but apply the concept of "belatedness" in general to comparative literature, we create a
rather concise explanation for why comparative literature seems antagonistic to the theoretical
discord of Romanticism, but also seems a product of the self-same Romanticism (as a movement
or broad period). Put simply, comparative literature, together with the concept of national
literatures and "specialization," came late in the game, late in the period known as Romanticism,
and as such, it always seems a "step removed" from the high theorizing of Jena-Berlin
Romanticism, and consequently, it appears to be threatened by the conflicts of modern theoretical
discourse, which may indeed be an extension of the Jena-Berlin phase, in such figures as Derrida,
de Man, Hirsch, and so on (where the contradictions of the Enlightenment have yet to be solved).
Robert J. Clements, in his Comparative Literature as Academic Discipline: A Statement of
Principles, Praxis, Standards, provides an outline of the modern origins of comparative literature
which is best quoted in its entirety, since it implicitly emphasizes Behdad's concept of
"belatedness" in relation to this discipline:
"Fortunately in 1832, well after the fall of the
Ancien Régime, Jean-Jacques Ampère condemned chauvinism as incompatible with literary
cosmopolitanism, although it remained a hydra difficult to dispatch, as French historians of
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comparative literature acknowledge ... Between 1828 and 1840 the Sorbonne professor AbelFrançois Villemain not only employed the term 'comparative literature' in his writings, but led the
pack by offering course work in this discipline. The influential Sainte-Beuve legitimized the term in
the Revue des deux mondes (itself a comparative title) and his Nouveaux lundis, to be followed by
an international company including Louis Betz, Max Koch, Joseph Texte, Longfellow, Georg
Brandes, and others. In Italy Mazzini's Scritti (1865-67) declared that no literature could be
nurtured by itself or could escape the influence of alien literatures ... the first occurrence of the
coinage 'vergleichende Literaturgeschichte' was in Moriz Carrière's book of 1854, Das Wesen und
die Formen der Poesie." (3-4)
The approximate dates for the origin of comparative literature, which Clements cites, become
more significant when we turn to Virgil Nemoianu's The Taming of Romanticism: European
Literature and the Age of Biedermeier, a work in which Nemoianu elaborates on the concept of a
period called Biedermeier, which lasted from approximately 1815 to 1848 (1). Before giving
characteristics of the Biedermeier, Nemoianu outlines the various scholarly endeavors which
attempted to define this as a post-Romantic period over the years. The concept of Biedermeier as
a literary-historical period was put forward in the 1920s by Paul Kluckhohn, Julius Wiegand, and
others, but more systematically after 1931 by Günther Weydt and Wilhelm Bietak, who triggered
an important scholarly debate in the 1930s (3-4). The participants agreed that the writings of the
period they were discussing were marked by certain common features, such as an "inclination
toward morality, a mixture of realism and idealism, peaceful domestic values, idyllic intimacy, lack
of passion, coziness, contentedness, innocent drollery, conservatism, resignation," and so on (4).
"The term 'Biedermeier' had originally been derogatory because of the character Gottlieb
Biedermeier, who was invented by Adolf Kussmaul and Ludwig Eichrodt, and introduced to the
public in the Munich Fliegende Blätter in 1855: "This smug and cozy philistine was a caricature of
the old-fashioned petty bourgeois of southern Germany and Austria" (4). Already by 1900, art
historians and fashion historians were using the term Biedermeier to describe the intimate, pretty,
and quiet paintings of the 1815 to 1848 period (Carl Spitzweg, Ferdinand Georg Waldmüller, etc.)
or even the furniture and dress styles (4). The term was also used to evoke the tone and color of
an entire age by the nostalgic-ironic novelists Georg Hermann, in his Jettchen Gebert (1906), and
Thomas Mann, in his Buddenbrooks (1901) (4). The debates of the 1930s concerning the
Biedermeier did have their problems, among which is the contemporary suspicion that the
reappraisal of the 1820s and 1830s was nationalistically motivated: Adolf Bartels, an anti-Semitic
populist, tried using Austrian Biedermeier writers as a weapon against "degenerate" modernist
writing of the pre-World War One period (4). The other suspicion was that the term Biedermeier is
just a tedious concoction, a fruit of, as Nemoianu says, "the tireless geistesgeschichtlich urge to
invent periodizations, define the spirit of an age, and multiply the breed of historical types" (5).
The third objection was that the really important and dynamic force of the 1830s and 1840s is Das
junge Deutschland (with figures like Karl Gutzkow, Heinrich Heine, Heinrich Laube, Ludwig Börne,
etc.), which, like similar contemporary movements (La giovine Italia,etc.), represented national
and radical tendencies, while the Biedermeier is merely a provincial and epigonic movement,
limited to writers like Eduard Mörike, Franz Grillparzer, Jeremias Gotthelf, Anette von DrosteHülshoff, and so on (5). Nonetheless, there were attempts to rescue the Biedermeier from such
restrictions in scope; Hermann Pongs found that demonic and grotesque characters and situations
abound in these writings, Rudolf Majut claimed that the Biedermeier could only be understood as a
dialectical whole, covering "all the writing" of the period, and most importantly, Friedrich Sengle
wrote his monumental three-volume Biedermeierzeit, in which he argued that the shifts in social
psychology of the time, the objective historical conditions, and the agglomeration of contrasting
literary developments, when combined, created a cultural climate that was different from both the
early and high Romantic periods and from the post-1850 Realist age (5-6). According to Sengle,
the term Biedermeier worked best as a traditional description of a particular "current" in German
literature of the time, while "Biedermeierzeit" could be applied to the entire, MetternichianRestoration period so as to accommodate even opposing literary trends, broadly united by a
framework of socio-historical events (6).
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It is within the framework of a Biedermeier, or should I say Biedermeierzeit paradigm, to use
Sengle's term, that we can place the origins of comparative literature, if we remember the dates
which Clements gives us for the beginning of the discipline. Behdad's concept of "belatedness" can
in this way be seen as an explanation of how the Biedermeier arose in relation to Romanticism
proper (which begins with the Jena-Berlin school around 1796 or 1797 and terminates around
1815, coinciding with Napoleon's defeat). The Biedermeier, together with its products (i.e.,
comparative literature, specializations, national literatures), was, to reintroduce Behdad's
terminology again, not an orthodox reiteration or a reapplication of a previous theory, but rather,
an interventionary articulation of a new problematic through the detour or, perhaps more
accurately, retour, of an earlier practice. Comparative literature, as a belated product of what was
once a high Jena-Berlin Romanticism, could not, at the moment of its modern inception, catch up
historically and existentially with the discursive, theoretical components of Romanticism proper. As
such, comparative literature, because it is a discipline, and more generally, the nature of
disciplines per se, as Biedermeier products, would always be naturally and historically threatened
by theory and the destabilizing character of such discourse, which, owing to the fact that the JenaBerlin school preceded the Biedermeier by nearly a quarter-century, itself precedes the inception
of disciplines per se, and thus, discipline follows theory, and is not necessarily Behdad's
interventionary articulation of a new problematic, but is certainly Behdad's detour or retour around
an earlier practice. With this notion in mind, that disciplines are created after theory and "detour"
around earlier events, we can see how comparative literature absorbs, for better or worse,
destabilizing elements that come before its inception (i.e. theory), but simultaneously, we can see
it always maintaining a perhaps not-so-safe distance from the destabilizations inherent in theory,
precisely by being historically tied to the Biedermeier period, which faces Romanticism proper, and
can even be interpreted as sharing a "door" with Romanticism, through which, if the door is left
open, theory will seep into discipline, and inevitably so.
Nemoianu seems well aware of this contamination that in part defines the Biedermeier, for
when he defines its nature, its constitution, we can see the Biedermeier absorbing certain
Romantic tendencies, but we can also see it struggling to define itself as an autonomous entity in
relation to its "loftier" predecessor. The disciples of Friedrich Schiller, after 1815, as Nemoianu
says, are "rare birds: few were inclined to accept play and aesthetic creation as privileged areas of
humaneness" (6-7). The aesthetician J.F. Herbart was typical of the Biedermeier, because he was
anti-Kantian and anti-Hegelian, a pragmatic idealist, who believed that art has some autonomy,
but that it should not be regarded as a salvation and should be adapted to reality to "provide
service" (7). Such utilitarian tendencies are represented by the first, modern network
of "popularization," as well, as Nemoianu calls it (7). In the 1820s, 30s, and 40s, there were
massive extensions of publishing houses, collections, libraries, and newspapers; Emile Girardin's
La Presse (1836) is considered the first modern newspaper (7). In Germany, the number of
publications hardly rose from 1800 to 1821, but tripled in the next two decades (7). Sensational
literature and fairy tales flourished as never before; collections of the brothers Grimm appeared
between 1812 and 1826, and England was hit slightly later, by translations of Hans Christian
Andersen in 1846, and of F.E. Paget's The Hope of the Katzekopfs, in 1844 (8). Even in science,
the lofty and visionary theories of earlier times were now empirically tested and directed toward
practical application; André-Marie Ampère, Jöns Berzelius, Justus Liebig, Hans Christian Oersted,
Georg Ohm, Farraday, and others, were characteristic of the age (8). There is even a Biedermeier
age of medicine, characterized by an uneasy empiricism that tried to accommodate James Mill's
empirical views with echoes of the earlier "organic vitality" theory; Samuel Hahnemann took the
mystical principles of earlier Romanticism and gave them a practical twist by starting a curative
industry, homeopathy (8-9). In historical study, the universal syntheses of Schelling and Hegel
were replaced by the scruples of Barthold Niebuhr and Leopold von Ranke, and by Friedrich Karl
von Savigny's attempts at objectivity; the Monumenta Germaniae Historica, directed by Georg
Heinrich Pertz, got underway in 1823, August Böckh began the Corpus Inscriptionum Graecorum in
1828, and Georg Grotefend and Jean-François Champollion deciphered the texts of Persian and
Egyptian civilization in the 1820s (9). The range of terms in the dictionary of the Académie
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Française was expanded, and dictionaries with 110,000 to 170,000 entries became popular (9).
Eight of the major German museums (including the Glyptothek and what is now called the Alte
Pinakothek in Munich) were initiated between 1815 and 1855 (10). The Biedermeier was also an
age of caricature and ironic art, like that of the post-Hogarthians (George Cruikshank, Thomas
Rowlandson, James Gillray, etc.) (10).
Nemoianu's description of the Biedermeier age, or more broadly, of a Biedermeierzeit, takes
into account the characteristics which were fruitful for the rise of comparative literature as a
discipline, because the age's need for compartmentalization, orderliness, and concretization, as
exemplified via the publishing of anthologies of literature, the proliferation of dictionaries and
encyclopedias, the creation of museums, and more generally, the need for stability, can in itself be
taken as a definition of the nature of disciplines per se, and of their common features, features
which distinguish disciplinary endeavors from purely theoretical ones, which appear to gravitate
toward meta-syntheses, panoramic, Schlegelian sweeps, and ideal, Platonic models. Nemoianu is
not alone in his argument for a distinct Biedermeier age (that differs from early and high
Romanticism and the post-1850 Realist period), and his views are echoed in the comments of
others. On the website, Bidermajer u Hrvatskoj (Biedermeier in Croatia), Vladimir Malekovic, in his
introductory article of the same title, gives the etymology for Biedermeier style as follows:
"Its
roots are in English Rococo furniture (Chippendale), in 'Gothic forms' which will experience their
revival at the end of the eighteenth century, especially in Germanic lands; in classicism, from
which it takes, among certain decorative elements, a tendency toward the functional; in the
Empire style, to which it owes something that G. Semper describes as 'antike Formalismus.'
Without a doubt the Biedermeier owes most to England, where already in the second half of the
eighteenth century there was a search for unity between technology and art, and the beginnings of
industrial technology use, especially in craft manufacture ... Cultural differences aided the
transition of classicism and Empire to Biedermeier, and the conflict of interest between countries
which decisively influenced that process (England, France, Austria, Germanic lands), if anything,
gave an ironic context to things ... The doors to the Empire style were opened across Europe by
Napoleon's victories, the doors to the Biedermeier were opened by his defeat ... The history of art
has already shown that those places receptive to classicism, particularly the Empire style, were
ideal places for the development of a new style -- Biedermeier. Among such places is Croatia,
where classicist and Empire cultures penetrated directly: from the Sava in the north to the Adriatic
in the south during the time of Napoleon's Illyria, notably, 'French Croatia'." (see Malekovic
<http://www.tel.hr/muo/bider/hrv/hmalek.htm>; my translation)
In his book on the Serbian Biedermeier poet, Jovan Sterija Popovic, who is described as a
"humorist and parodist," Dragisa Zivkovic defines the Biedermeier as follows:
"The main
characteristic of this epoch is the mixture of directions and trends, so that the Biedermeier appears
as a stylistic complex in which come together Byronists, late classicists, and late Romantic
epigones, young German, liberally oriented revolutionaries and formalistically oriented novelists.
And these 'feuding brothers' of the Biedermeier, so similar in general worldly feeling and in
melancholic mood, but then again so different in their literary orientations, use parody as a
general offensive tool. Parodied are the classicist epic and Baroque novel, Romantic idealism and
sentimental pathos, enlightened treatises and moralistic writings. At the basis of all this lies a
strengthening of traditional consciousness and conservative thoughts tied together with an ever
growing historicism. Pushed out of politics, the Biedermeier citizen turns to literature and cultural
works, hoping to become the equal of the nobility not only through monetary wealth but also
through cultivation and style of life. That aristocratic-civic culture ('transforming of nobility to
bourgeois' and 'aristocratization of civilians') slowly erases and dulls class boundaries; the satire
which is intensively nursed in this period is directed more toward human imperfections than
toward social-class oppositions. From there, in that genre, we come upon a caricaturing of banal
and trivial occurrences in human behavior." (Bidermajerski Usamljenik Sterija 10-11; my
translation.)
Such observations allow us to see comparative literature, as a discipline, and the nature of
disciplines per se, within the framework of a socio-historical milieu from which the origins of
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disciplinariness emanate. As I mentioned earlier, when we speak of Romanticism in overly broad
terms, we come to view comparative literature as being some sort of "paradoxical" product of the
self-same Romanticism which also gave birth to modern theoretical debates that still affect us, and
which threaten to destabilize the concept of disciplinary studies in general, to break down the
boundaries, as it were. Behdad's concept of "belatedness," when coupled with Nemoianu's
argument for a Biedermeier milieu that comes after early and high Romanticism but before the
later turbulence of a post-1850 Realism, becomes a rather elaborate, but I believe satisfactory
explanation for why comparative literature is not a parallel product of Jena-Berlin theorizing on
literature, literariness, aesthetics, and the contradictions of Enlightenment discourse (radical
criticism versus Bildung), but is a belated product of the concerns and problems which marked this
earlier, more idealistic and philosophical phase of Romanticism. When we think in terms of a bipart model, where Romanticism is followed by a Biedermeier phase that attempts to put thought
and idea into a practical, and serviceable context, via the creation of disciplinary studies, the
building of museums, the inception of national literatures, the making of specializations, and so
on, we realize that comparative literature is not paradoxically tied to the potentially destabilizing
discourse of Hegelian and Schlegelian sweeps, and more recently, Derridian discursiveness, but is
a "step removed" from theory. Why do I say this? By "step removed," I mean to say that
comparative literature, as a product of the Biedermeierzeit, is itself historically and spatially
removed from theory originating around Jena and Berlin, or rather, separated by time and context
(about a quarter-century). This removal, rather than cementing the impossibility of a reconciliation
between theory and discipline-praxis, has its good points. By being a "step removed" from high
theory in its own origin, comparative literature is guaranteed autonomy through historical and
existential facts, and precisely because of this, because of its Biedermeier-originated existence as
a "discipline," it can attempt to reconcile itself with the revolutionary and destabilizing nature of
theory, because by looking at theory and theoretical concerns, it does not need to "fear consuming
itself in its own flames," a phrase that Beiser uses to explain the collapse of the
Enlightenment/early Romantic project. It does not need to fear that by looking at and trying to
understand theory, it will recreate the Hegelian and Schlegelian attempt to understand and
transcend Kant, an attempt that turns into a Phoenix. As Nemoianu says, wrapped around
Biedermeier events was "Metternich's system, not the repressive ogre-like enclosure it was made
out to be by partisan commentators, but rather a dialectical and sophisticated framework that
could preserve stability by absorbing and particularly by expecting opposition from within and
without" (12). There is no destructive paradox enacted when comparative literature glances at its
preceding, Romantic period, because, to use Behdad's terminology again, it retours around earlier
events, and, I will add, allows earlier events to pass through it, thereby maintaining the potential
for reconciliation between theory and discipline.
Reconciliation through Literary History and Other Things
I mentioned in the introduction that in this final part of the paper, I would attempt reconciling
theory and discipline (i.e., comparative literature) by bringing in the notion of literary history as a
medium through which antagonisms can be subsumed, and perhaps even cancelled out, by larger
narrative accounts of literary and theoretical development, by meta-endeavors, as it were. To view
literary history as a possible salvation, where theoretical destabilizations and disciplinary cohesions
come together, is problematic in this day and age, to say the least.
David Perkins, in his work, Is Literary History Possible?,voices serious reservations about the
possibility and accuracy of literary history, to do anything. Literary history, of the narrative type,
was rather popular during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, and was guided by
three main assumptions: a) that literary works are formed by their historical context b) that
change in literature takes place developmentally c) that this change is the unfolding of an idea,
principle, or suprapersonal entity (1-2). The assault on literary history was already evident by the
end of the nineteenth century, with its fin de siècle aestheticism, because such critics as Edmond
Scherer and Emile Faguet pointed out that historical contextualism can explain everything except
what one most wants to explain, literary "genius" (7). Russian Formalism did not question the
possibility of writing literary history, but argued that historical contextualism was ineffective, and
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that traces of development were to be found in the text itself (8). New Criticism programmatically
rejected literary history, and eventually, deconstruction, by exposing the aporias of periods,
movements, genres, classifications, and so on, made it difficult, probably impossible to generalize
texts and frame them within meta-historical discussions (8-9). Perkins remains unconvinced that
literary history can be written, because future criteria will demand different literary histories, and
so on, but he still believes that it is a necessary endeavor (17). He remains unimpressed by the
obvious artificiality of literary history; the chosen starting point of discussion in literary history has
a strong impact on the way the past is represented, so that quite often, a phase of synthesis and
homogeneity is said to precede the period which is the subject of the book, as in one article by
Marshall Brown on nineteenth-century Realism, which stipulates that the eighteenth century was
"more unified," or in the work of Ian Watt, where the divisions of the eighteenth century are
juxtaposed to the homogenous Renaissance and seventeenth century, or in the work of Victorian
specialists, who speak of Romanticism as the lost age of "universals" (36-37). Perkins argues that
the ending of a literary history is equally artificial, set up for reasons of climax, as in Wilhelm
Scherer's History of German Literature from 1883, which concludes with Goethe, saying that the
latest 50 years will not be dealt with, since they will "spoil the study" (37). As far as the
postmodern, "encyclopedic" literary history is concerned (examples of which are the Columbia
Literary History of the United States from 1987 and A New History of French Literature from
1989), Perkins dismisses it as not being literary history per se because it establishes diversity and
contradiction as structural principles, foregoes closure and consensus, and most importantly, does
not organize the past into an entity (56-60).
Roland Champagne, in his work, Literary History in the Wake of Roland Barthes, echoes certain
aspects of Perkins' comments, particularly the opinion that the concept of literary history has been
problematized in our own day and age. Barthes in fact played a key role in bringing theoretical
concerns into the arena of literary history, and through that gesture, he foreshadows what I may
be said to be doing here, namely, setting up literary history as a bridge on which theoretical,
meta-literary concerns meet up with disciplinary and empirically oriented concerns regarding the
integrity of national literatures, specific genres, styles, and so on. Barthes enlarged the empiricalscientific view of literary history developed by Gustave Lanson to include "that 'impressionism'
which Lanson had easily relegated to an activity called 'criticism.' By introducing the subject into
history, Barthes advocated a new era for literary history wherein texts of previous historical
moments would be re-examined in order to account for the complex threads of the subjective
investigator in the assumptions of established literary traditions" (3). Barthes refuted the
systematic ordering of what he called "classical texts" by literary history into a linear and temporal
succession of one tradition after another, by advocating the "modern text" (like the works of
Flaubert), as having an "historical self-awareness" that paradoxically makes it "ahistorical,"
whereby we can, by reading the modern text, understand the problematics of literary history
through our contemplation of how these new texts generate meaning, rather than how they can be
grouped into convenient literary movements (5). It is interesting that Barthes should define the
modern text, which invites interpretation rather than periodization, as originating around 1850,
and as having something to do with Flaubert, because, as we remember, Ali Behdad applies his
concept of "belatedness" to the orientalism which operates in Flaubert's Notes de voyages of 1850,
this being a concept which I found easily explains and parallels the relationship of the Biedermeier
to Romanticism, even though Behdad and Barthes seem to be speaking of a post-Biedermeier,
post-1850 phase. It is entirely possible that they may not even have a Biedermeier context or
paradigm in mind, but are, however implicitly, elaborating their arguments in terms of the more
traditional, simpler, and cleaner Romanticism-Realism "break" in literary periods.
Barthes's approach, which brought the "subject" into the question of literary history, seems to
have rubbed off on Mario J. Valdés' article, "Rethinking Literary History -- Comparatively," because
here, Valdés, while attempting to break the confines of typical, national literary histories, advises
caution. He believes that a shift has occurred from "validation to signification," whereby literary
historians must now "reconceptualize historical process to include the relations between texts and
the contexts of production and reception ... The Foucaultian linking of power and knowledge points
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here ... to an awareness that, while events did occur in the past, we give meaning to [them] ...
This is not a defeatist invalidation of the process of history-writing; it is merely a frank
acknowledgment of a hermeneutic reality" (6). Valdés further speaks of how in order for a
"comparative literary history" to take such things into account, it would have to "foreground ...
methodological frameworks (hermeneutic, post-structuralist, post-colonial, feminist, and so on)
and directly address its own theoretical assumptions regarding both texts and contexts (sociocultural, economic, political, aesthetic). How this might work in practice [remains to be seen]." (6).
Valdés's concept of the "comparative literary history," which I believe would have a greater
chance of reconciling theoretical discord with comparative literature as a coherent body and
disciplinary effort, precisely because of the comparative thrust of such a history, is more difficult to
set up than a merely national literary history, that functions within smaller boundaries, and that
does not offer as great a promise of reconciliation. Even the current Comparative Literary History
Series (initiated and sponsored by the International Comparative Literature Association) which is
published under the directorship of Valdés, is not set up as a full and comprehensive analysis of
literary and meta-literary concerns; Romantic Irony, edited by Frederick Garber, gravitates (with
most of the articles) toward German literature and there are no articles on Romantic Irony in Far
Eastern literatures; in the case of Symbolist Movement, edited by Anna Balakian, most articles
gravitate towards France, and so on. An assessment of literary movements is usually tied to their
country of origin, so to speak, and besides, comparative literary histories, like the series just
mentioned, are limited by practical concerns as well (they would be thousands of pages long if
they dealt with literary periods in a fully international fashion, and there is always the risk that a
"forced internationalism" of certain movements would result, creating an artificial and false
assessment). We should also remember that the above mentioned series is published as individual
collections of separate articles, in "postmodern encyclopedic" style (to use Perkins's phrase), on
certain topics and movements, so that the very form gravitates toward fragmentation. An example
of a comparative literary history that functions as a narrative, putting movements into chapters,
would be Werner P. Friederich's Outline of Comparative Literature from Dante Alighieri to Eugene
O'Neill, published in 1954, but such a format also has its limitations, and may be accused of being
forced, overly general, and artificial. Indeed, such ultra-comprehensive endeavors do have an
amateurish air about them. Valdés's point is thus well taken, that comparative literary histories
would be difficult to set up, because both methodological frameworks and theoretical assumptions
would have to be taken into account.
In his An Analytical Approach to Comparative Literature, Jintaro Kataoka also speculates on the
potential for comparative, and world literary histories. Among several interesting points that he
makes are three which stood out in my mind, and which seem crucial if one is to develop a truly
comparative literary history: a) for a comparative literary history to emerge, dimensional
restrictions need to be overcome b) for such a history to emerge, the intuitive factor of literary
creation needs to be accommodated for c) for this history to emerge, the literary historian must
recognize as his true audience the writers who are spoken of. The first point, of overcoming
dimensional restrictions, Kataoka appears to derive from John Drinkwater's The Outlines of
Literature and Art (1924), which attempted to give form to a history of world literature, and
Kataoka elaborates by saying that if "there could exist a legitimate history of world literature very
well adapted to the life [political, economic, cultural, climactic, etc.] in these two different worlds
[East and West], then and then only would there be able to appear a real history of the Western
Literature and a valid history of the Eastern Literature" (16). Regarding the second point, of
accommodating intuition, which Kataoka also calls the "impetus of life" and the "feeling of
existence," it is said that intuition, being our thought at some primordial level, "is not yet intellect
and as such it is not concerned with the relations between things: it cannot err, as intellect can, by
referring things to the wrong concepts" (65); Kataoka argues that such a purely aesthetic,
unerring idea (which he seems to manufacture by mixing the ideas of Kant, Schelling, Bergson,
and others) must be accommodated for in world literary histories, primarily because art, that is to
say, literature, is being dealt with, and he offers an equation which would accommodate for this
creative principle, that is evocative of Keats's "Truth and Beauty": (L times S) L = SLsquare,
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where S stands for scientific factors which endorse intuition through experiment, and L is
literature, and where S corresponds with Keats's "Truth" and L with his "Beauty" (65). Regarding
the third point, Kataoka argues that for "a literary historian, the aim and the interest he seeks to
find are just those the author tries to embody ... In creation the author should, either consciously
or unconsciously, appreciate the position of the literary historian, in whose work the former is to
be represented exclusively by his own productions" (83). The reason I mention Kataoka's points is
because they demonstrate how a comparative literary history, particularly in order somehow to
reconcile and intermesh high theory with the disciplinary endeavor of writing a literary history,
would have to juggle several concepts and needs simultaneously. Kataoka's proposition is a
perfect example of the difficulty of such an endeavor, because while his first point is well taken,
that dimensional restrictions need to be broken for such a literary history to emerge (which echoes
Valdés's point in his article), the second point, dealing with intuition as a pure, unerring, and
Keatsian principle that must be interwoven into a comparative literary history, while it sounds
pretty, threatens, much like the early Romantic endeavor to solve Enlightenment contradictions,
"to consume itself in its own flames." Kataoka's final point, that literary historians should write for
authors as their true audience, I am sure, would be attacked for leaning too closely on Formalist
principles (i.e., that readers when reading, and writing, should put themselves into the mind of a
writer).
Setting up a comparative literary history that would somehow be aware of its own theoretical
limitations and fallacies, but would simultaneously offer an effective and understandable
assessment of the topic at hand (literary influence, period styles, revolutionary trends, etc.), and
thereby, would reconcile the dangerous, and cautionary aspects of theory, with the need to
maintain a disciplinary endeavor (the very writing of a literary history), is not simple. Valdés's
comments, Perkins's grudges, and Kataoka's all-too-lofty machinations are obvious examples of
the difficult position I find myself in: offering literary history as a salvation, where theory and
discipline meet. I believe the best way to ensure for success in this venture is to remain modest,
and aware of the subtleties that are involved in the very process of writing, which becomes a
meta-writing when literary history is involved. Earl Miner, in his Comparative Poetics: An
Intercultural Essay on Theories of Literature, almost seems to be apologizing for writing his work,
when he concludes the first chapter by saying the following: "Nothing in the preceding, nothing in
what follows, is meant to argue for a single conception of comparative poetics. All that is argued,
and it is quite enough, is that comparative poetics requires two things: a satisfactory conception
and practice of comparison along with an attention to poetics (conceptions of literature) that rest
on historically sound evidence" (32).
Post-structuralism would of course ask the question, What is "historically sound evidence"?, so
that Miner's comment itself falls apart, once again undermining the purpose behind literary history.
As I have said, comparative literary history may reconcile theory and discipline, but only through a
cautionary and modest approach. My proposal for success requires that we write a conceptual
literary history, which is a sub-branch of narrative literary history, but is a more interesting
variant, because it organizes and interconnects events in a powerful way, by exhibiting the
interrelation of events as the logical relations of ideas; a possible example would be to view only a
"section" of the eighteenth century as the "Age of Reason," and then to display certain texts as
being not completely representative, but only representative of particular "sides" of the idea in
question (Perkins 49). We would have to keep in mind two things while writing such a subtle and
cautionary history. First, we would have to acknowledge Barthes' conception of the "subject" as
being an active factor in the construction of a literary history, whereby we would have to argue
that our analysis of certain literary-historical periods, rather than extracting the "essence" of a
period, is juxtaposing our own notion of the "essence of a period" onto the period in question in
order to attempt explaining our own contemporary period, in the act of "hypothetically" explaining
an earlier historical period, whereby the "hypotheticality" of this latter maneuver, rather than
being cancelled out through the act of bestowing significance on our own period (echoing the
Hegelian dialectic), would itself be recognized as significant, in the sense that certain hypothetical
explanations are useful (practical and beneficial). The second thing we would have to keep in mind
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(which is required for the above mechanism to work) while writing a conceptual, comparative
literary history, is a comment uttered by Dilthey, that while he cannot accept the
teleological/mystical ideas of Hegel in unmodified form, he is willing to accept that because of
complex and specific circumstances, an idea may indeed have an historical moment of prevalence
(qtd. in Perkins 134).
The other, perhaps final way to attempt reconciling theory and comparative literature as a
discipline, which may be accommodated for most appropriately in a conceptual literary history, by
the way, is through the use of geometrical models of discourse. However unusual or perverse it
may sound, I was inspired to propose this as a possible solution by a section of Paul de Man's
article, "The Resistance to Theory," where he mentions the following: "Seventeenth-century
epistemology, for instance, at the moment when the relationship between philosophy and
mathematics is particularly close, holds up the language of what it calls geometry (mos
geometricus), and which in fact includes the homogenous concatenation between space, time and
number, as the sole model of coherence and economy. Reasoning more geometrico is said to be
almost the only mode of reasoning that is infallible, because it is the only one to adhere to the true
method, whereas all other ones are by natural necessity in a degree of confusion of which only
geometrical minds can be aware" (364-65). Geometrical models, precisely because of their threedimensional nature of representation, whether they be on paper or contemplated in the mind,
allow for a spatial analogy with the external world, outside of the "subject," and thereby, such
models allow for bonding between theoretical concepts, literary/aesthetic styles, and architectural
figures. This may be a possible solution that brings together theory and comparative literature (as
a discipline requiring cohesion), via the representation of a conceptual-stylistic-figural continuum,
through the three-dimensionality of geometrical models. I should mention a rather important point
here, that while these geometrical models which I am proposing do evoke and should evoke
spatial constructs (architecture, etc.), they are nonetheless and necessarily toned-down, by being
only models, and as such, they are subtle and fluid enough to function within a discipline, such as
ours, that deals with discourse, text, and the very notion of medium.
These geometrical models of discourse would, in their final stage, best work within a
conceptual, comparative literary history, because they themselves, through their spatial analogy
with the world, stand as comparative concepts/constructs. The models would probably emerge
from a subtle and historically self-conscious analysis, that may deal with literature per se, or
certain textual features, or even the notion and nature of medium and communication. The models
might even emerge initially within the context of a rather limited discussion, that may only deal
with a few writers, or a few theoreticians, but would eventually, gradually, and cautiously, be
verified or disproved within larger contexts (literary histories, New Historical readings, politicalideological discussions, etc.). It may be the case that a certain number of these proposed models
of discourse would be rejected as inaccurate or incomplete, but that a few would be found to be
rather effective in their potential for explanation within our discipline. To use the example of
myself, I began playing with the concept of these geometrical models through my reading of the
Lacan-Derrida-Johnson-Irwin debate on Poe's "The Purloined Letter," which is a rather focused
topic, but gradually, after becoming acquainted with hermeneutics, I was further able to develop
my views on geometrical models, and their potential to reconcile antagonisms, by looking at
Gadamer's disapproval of Cartesian and Hegelian models of subjectivity, and his preference for
Aristotle, who, unlike Plato, does not separate theory from praxis (qtd. in Hoy 60). This Platonic
separation of theory from praxis is, at some fundamental level, what I have been contemplating
throughout this paper. The geometrical models which I am proposing, that might crop up
anywhere but would probably be used as tools in conceptual literary histories, are possible
solutions to discord and fragmentation, and I assume, as with any such unusual proposal,
modifications are both required and welcome.
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The table is my own attempt at these geometrical (and numerical) models, and is merely
offered to illustrate what I have been saying. In the table are various models that I have
associated with certain types of discourse, and certain period styles. In the case of the Rococo
model, I have left one side open, to emphasize that the Rococo was a "play of surfaces," via
chinoiserie and other features, and not a closed system like Romanticism, which Frye compares to
Greek architecture and says, citing Melville, that both showed "reverence for the Archetype" (25).
In the case of the Hegelian dialectic, I set the model up as doubling the Aristotelian dialectic
(which Gadamer prefers for its emphasis on "phronesis," i.e. practical wisdom, the recognition of
man's finitude and historicity) (qtd. in Hoy 60). In this way, my model for the Hegelian dialectic
accommodates for Romantic reflexivity, and for the Hegelian idea of "coming-to-selfconsciousness," which gradually translates historical experience into a false absolute, giving the
individual a sense of "being in a center," and other similar things. Such were the thoughts which
went through my mind as I set these models up. In the case of the Derridian model, I set it up as
framing the Hegelian model for reflexivity, because Derrida argues against "logocentrism" but is
still forced to use the language he disdains. In the case of the Poe-Borges model, I set it up as
framing the Platonic notion of an "ideal truth beyond reality," in order to account for the "dream
within a dream" quality that is found in the work of these two writers. The last two models, the
doubled, self-framed Hegelian dialectic and the infinitely multiplied one, have not yet been
attained in discourse, and are my speculation on "future models," that might crop up in future
literary-historical periods, and so on.
Even though these models require further elaboration, more discussion as to why particular
geometrical shapes were chosen and as to how exactly such shapes would be used as disciplinary
tools, a lengthy speech on these and similar issues would go beyond the immediate topic of this
paper. Once again, I must stress that the views, particularly of the third part of this paper, are
only possible solutions, and require further analysis, but I will venture to say that at least some of
my opinions may be relevant. It is already evident in these models, even at a primarily visual
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level, that some faint reconciliation between literary theory and our discipline seems to have taken
place. The models are, through their simple, reduced, and elegant lines, simultaneously reverential
toward the Biedermeier smugness of disciplines and caricatural of the high Romantic endeavors of
Derrida and company.
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